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Abstract
The argumentative stasis theory and enthymeme principles richly complement each other but 
they have rarely been investigated jointly. We correct this oversight first with a principled 
re-analysis of the stasis tradition, resulting in a double-layer stasis system: Cicero’s later 
system (in De Oratore and Topica)	with	“action”	 stasis’	 subclassification,	modified	by	
Kenneth Burke’s dramatic pentad of act, scene, agent, agency, purpose (in A Grammar of 
Motives). Then inspired by Ronald Langacker’s salience theory in cognitive linguistics, we 
secure two stasis deployment strategies: selection (profile against base) and prominence 
(trajector	against	landmark).	Stasis	theory	thus	solidified,	we	examine	how	it	interacts	with	
the two central aspects of the enthymemic thesis: incompleteness and probability and how 
the	enthymemic	 thesis	helps	explain	 the	force	of	stasis	 theory.	This	 inquiry	contributes	 to	
rhetorical theory and criticism; argumentation studies; and linguistics, by showing the reach 
of salience theory.
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The connections between stasis theory and enthymemes are firm and sinewy, but they 
have rarely been noticed in rhetorical theory. There are inklings of connections between 
them in ancient rhetoric, but only inklings. Cicero’s Topica defines “a topic as the region 
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of an argument, and an argument as a course of reasoning which firmly establishes a 
matter	about	which	there	is	some	doubt”	(1949,	p.	387),	where	“a	course	of	reasoning”	
implicates	the	enthymeme	and	“doubt”	implicates	issue	or	stasis.	Nor	has	modern	rhetoric	
brought them together firmly. Only a very limited number of works touch upon both stasis 
and enthymeme in modern rhetoric, and even these mostly fail to realize their essential 
connections.	They	are	both	often	brought	together	in	writing	textbooks,	for	instance,	but	
without the sense of their natural and reciprocal affinities. In a rather typical treatment, as 
in	Lauer’s	excellent	Invention in Rhetoric and Composition, they come together almost by 
accident, little more than items in the same list: 
Kairos and status	 as	 initiators	of	discourse;	 special	 and	common	 topics	as	exploratory	
arts; dissoi logoi,	enthymeme,	example	or	dialogue	as	 forms	of	 rhetorical	 reasoning;	and	
probability, truth, or certainty as rhetorical epistemologies. (Lauer, 2004, p. 22)
Bachman (1996), and Crowley and Hawhee (1999/2012), who attach much 
importance to stasis and enthymeme respectively, still do not demonstrate a clear 
relationship; the two terms seem to be presented as parallels. But there are inklings of 
connections in modern rhetoric as well. Brockriede and Ehninger (1960), for instance, 
link	the	four	“disputable	questions”	(staseis)	with	corresponding	“claims”	of	the	Toulmin	
Model (TM), a valuable insight, and Toulmin himself later characterized his model as 
enthymemic in nature (Jasinski, 2001, p. 206). But Brockriede and Ehninger include the 
enthymeme	among	their	 traditional	argumentation	“inadequacies”—inferior	 to	the	TM,	
apparently—so the two notions are ships passing in the night. Corbett and Connors (1999), 
while	observing	that	stasis	theory	“might	help	students	decide	on	a	thesis”	(p.	28),	fail	to	
associate	their	“thesis	in	a	single	declarative	sentence”	(p.	29)	with	their	rigidly	structured	
conclusion-with-reason enthymeme, thus narrowly missing the connection of stasis and 
enthymeme. They too, like Brockriede and Ehninger, fail to realize the connections they 
adumbrate. 
However, at least two contemporary authors, John Gage and Linda Bensel-Meyers, do 
understand the stasis/enthymem connections, clearly associating stasis with enthymeme 
as interwoven elements in essay composition. Gage’s Shape of Reason (1987/1991/2001) 
scrupulously defines an argumentative thesis as “an idea, stated as an assertion, that 
represents a reasoned response to a question at issue and that will serve as the central 
idea	of	a	composition”	(2001,	p.	46).	“[Q]uestion	at	issue”,	of	course,	is	a	stasis,	and	“a	
reasoned	response”	he	makes	clear	a	few	pages	later,	 is	an	enthymeme.	“At	this	point,”	
he says, “we need a name for the relationship created between a reason and a conclusion. 
I will call this combination of assertions an enthymeme, a term adopted from classical 
rhetoric”	(ibid.,	p.	58).	Deeply	influenced	by	Gage	(as	shown	in	the	acknowledgements),	
Bensel-Meyers’s Rhetoric for Academic Reasoning presents an even more definite 
connection of the two terms: 
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Drawing	from	classical	stasis	theory,	this	text	shows	students	how	they	can	use	the	enthymeme	
to identify what is discipline-specific about the questions specialists ask about their subject 
and how these questions control the type of reasoning the specialists use to arrive at answers. 
(1992,	p.	xiii)
This captures Bensel-Meyers’s defining approach perfectly. The enthymeme as a 
thesis statement, blended consistently with a particular kind of stasis, constitutes the 
most	outstanding	feature	of	 this	writing	textbook.	However,	neither	Gage	nor	Bensel-
Meyers takes the intersection of enthymeme and stasis far enough. They are both still 
a bit too restrained in scope—very likely due to the narrow monolayer stasis system 
they	share	(there	are	no	substaseis	 in	 their	 texts),	and	perhaps	 to	 the	equally	narrow,	
conclusion-plus-one premise enthymeme structure they share with scholars like Corbett 
and Connors.2 When both staseis and enthymemes are approached theoretically, however, 
not	 just	 in	prescriptive	writing	 textbooks,	 the	nature	of	 their	connections	become	far	
more apparent.
In serious stasis studies, from Hermagoras and Cicero to Crowley and Hawhee (perhaps 
our finest modern stasis theorists), the canonical four staseis are generally subdivided 
so as to pin down more specifically the point at issue (though, as always in scholarship, 
there	exist	disputes	about	those	subdivisions).	Stasis	subdivision	results	 in	at	 least	 two	
layers	of	staseis,	which	means	that	not	only	staseis	of	“fact”,	“definition”,	“nature”,	and	
“action”	in	the	first	layer	can	trigger	inquiry,	but	their	substaseis	in	the	second	layer	also	
trigger inquiry. Importantly, each subdivision can lead to corresponding enthymemes. 
Often, it is a more specific substasis that actually kindles the thesis/enthymeme of the 
argument. As regards the form of enthymeme, Gage and Bensel-Meyers both—while not 
failing	to	recognize	flexibility—concentrate	on	the	rhetorical	syllogism	of	conclusion	with	
minor premise (probably for the convenience of composition instruction), leaving other 
potential forms in a quite dim background, hard to discern. According to Aristotle’s direct 
and indirect statements on enthymeme in the Rhetoric,	 there	exist	many	more	forms	of	
enthymeme beyond the conclusion and minor premise structure. So, the response to the 
issue at hand may present itself in various ways, the choice of which depends on better 
suiting the particular rhetorical situation. In short, we are not here to discount the admirable 
work	of	Gage	and	of	Bensel-Meyers,	but	to	extend	their	unification	of	enthymemes	and	
staseis by broadening their concepts of both. 
We	extend	Gage’s	 and	Bensel-Meyers’s	 constructive	partnership	of	 stasis	 and	
enthymeme through a demonstrated two-layer stasis system, and a richer sense of 
enthymeme variety. 
1. Staseis: Number, Naming, and Order
“Stasis”	has	been	defined	in	a	variety	of	ways	due	to	different	focuses.	Fahnestock	and	
Secor	(1983),	 for	an	exemplary	 instance,	offer	a	succinct,	division-centered	definition	
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as	“a	 taxonomy,	a	 system	of	classifying	 the	kinds	of	questions	 that	can	be	at	 issue	
in	a	controversy”	 (p.	137).	However,	 there	are	disagreements	about	 the	 taxonomy,	
disagreements on the number, the naming, the order, and the subdivision of staseis. As 
regards number, most theorists stick to Hermagoras’s four, but it is not difficult to find 
variation.	Some	rhetoricians	scale	down	(Corbett	and	Connors	 (1999),	 for	example,	
accept the three staseis of fact, definition, and quality, leaving action out); others scale 
up	(Gage	(2001)	has	six,	the	two	extra	being	interpretation	and	consequence).	We	hold	
that four staseis are more reasonable, as they cover all the major issues possibly arising 
from any phenomenon with clear distinctions between themselves, especially when a 
second layer opens up the range. Corbett and Connors’s discarded stasis, action, is not 
only constructive for dealing with a law case, but also in the tackling of other cases such 
as	 the	“intellectual	 jurisdiction”	substantially	 illustrated	by	Alan	Gross	 (2004).	And	
expansions	of	the	stasis	taxonomy	are	inevitably	redundant.	Gage’s	“Interpretation”,	for	
instance,	is	similar	to	“definition”	and	to	“value,”	as	Gage	himself	acknowledges	(2001,	
pp.	42-43);	and	his	“consequence”,	focusing	on	cause	and	effect,	easily	folds	 into	 the	
stasis	of	“fact”.	
As for the naming, all four staseis are associated with different terms of similar 
meanings:	“fact”	might	be	“conjecture”	or	“inference”;	“definition”	can	be	“interpretation”	
or	“designation”;	“quality”	shows	up	as	“nature”	and	“value”;	“action”	 is	known	as	
“policy”,	“procedure”	and	“jurisdiction”—to	give	a	non-exhaustive	survey.	We	adopt	
“fact”,	“definition”,	“nature”	and	“action”,	as	these	concepts	are	more	direct	and	widely	
applied than their alternatives and they have also long appeared in the translated works of 
Cicero’s De Inventione, Topica and De Oratore.3
The order of the staseis is less controversial, usually following a movement from fact 
to action. The first three staseis, in particular, follow a logic of occurrence, denotation, 
and	context,	as	Kennedy	(1994)	lays	out:
the fact at issue, whether or not something had been done at a particular time by a particular 
person: e.g., Did X actually kill Y. …
the	legal	“definition”	of	a	crime:	e.g.	Was	the	admitted	killing	of	Y	by	X	murder	or	homicide.	
…
the	“quality”	of	 the	action,	 including	its	motivation	and	possible	justification:	e.g.,	Was	the	
murder of Y by X in some way justified by the circumstances … (Kennedy, 1994, pp. 98-99)
Each stasis depends in a fundamental way on agreement about the logically prior 
stasis. First, one wants to know, did something happen; if it did, what should we call 
it;	if	it	did	and	we	have	a	name	for	it,	what	are	the	contextual	factors	that	give	its	fuller	
meaning.	The	next	move,	for	action,	is	equally	natural:	given	this	fuller	meaning,	what	
should we do about it.4	Variations	of	order,	however,	also	exist,	 in	both	ancient	and	
modern	works,	sometimes	even	in	the	same	text.	For	 instance,	 in	Cicero’s	De	Oratore 
(1942) they are often arranged as fact, nature, definition, action, but not always5 and in 
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Voss and Keene (1995, p. 664) we get fact, definition, action and nature (or, using their 
terms, fact, interpretation, policy and value). If a phenomenon is only probed through 
one stasis, the order may make little difference, but with more issues covered in the 
exploration,	the	sequence	itself	is	meaningful.	For	Hermagoras,	concerned	with	lawsuits,	
the order of necessity and importance for arguing is as above; other situations may prefer 
or even require different orders. 
2. Cicero’s System of Staseis 
Research on subdividing staseis is relatively sparse. Among the ancients, Cicero takes 
precedence. Hermagoras, Hermogenes and Cicero all discussed the topic in some 
detail. The former two, however, are concerned primarily with forensic rhetoric (and 
Hermagoras’	work	 is	unfortunately	not	extant).	Cicero	goes	beyond	 legal	 realms,	but	
his	 stasis	 taxonomy	needs	some	reconstruction.	 It	 is	 scattered	among	several	of	his	
works, especially De Inventione, De Oratore and Topica. The one serious subdivision in 
contemporary rhetoric, Crowley and Hawhee’s, hews closely to the Ciceronian system for 
the first three; diverging only with their fourth. Cicero’s discussions on stasis are a rich 
and solid foundation for any further investigation, but those scattered elusive remarks 
have not been assembled yet to form a complete intelligible picture. In what follows, 
we first distil Cicero’s complicated systems of staseis and subdivisions from his work, 
in	partial	 support	of	Crowley	and	Hawhee’s	modernization;	next,	we	propose	some	
necessary modifications. 
Cicero’s stasis subdivisions evolved between his early work, De Inventione, and 
his later treatises, especially De Oratore and Topica, which bear much similarity to this 
topic.	The	subdividing	of	the	stasis	of	“fact”	shows	a	particularly	wide	divergence.	De 
Inventione uses a rather simplistic time-based criterion, Cicero saying that
the dispute about a fact … can be assigned to any time. For the question can be ‘What has been 
done?’ e.g.	‘Did	Ulysses	kill	Ajax?’	and	‘What	is	being	done?’	e.g. ‘Are the Fregellans friendly 
to the Roman people?’ and what is going to occur, e.g. ‘If we leave Carthage untouched, will 
any harm come to the Roman state?’ (1949, p. 23)
That	 is,	 the	 young	Cicero	 subdivides	 “fact/conjecture”	 into	 the	 tripartite	
categorizations	of	 “past”,	 “present”	and	“future”.	But	 the	mature	Cicero	comes	 to	
regard this subdivision as both too broad (in terms of time) and too narrow (in terms 
of only	 time);	essentially,	he	drops	 the	 temporal	dimension	as	an	explicit	criterion	of	
categorization.	In	his	later	work,	he	offers	the	following	subdivisions:	“existence”	(which	
incorporates	all	 three	time	dimensions),	“origin”,	“cause”	and	“change”.	In	Topica, he 
says 
There are four ways of dealing with conjecture or inference: the question is asked, first 
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whether	anything	exists	or	 is	 true;	second,	what	 its	origin	is;	 third,	what	cause	produced	it;	
fourth, what changes can be made in anything. (1949, p. 445)6
For	each	substasis	an	example	 is	offered	 right	after	 to	 illustrate	 its	meaning	and	
application.	But	most	examples	refer	to	different	things;	it	would	be	more	illustrative	if	
they all revolved around one thing or one phenomenon.
For	“definition”,	Cicero’s	classifying	also	evolves	considerably	after	De Inventione, 
where	he	focuses	on	“by	what	word	that	which	has	been	done	is	to	be	described”	(1949,	
p. 23); in the following lines, he decomposes that phrase and suggests that there are two 
realizations, the actual word and the description, each of which may occur independently. 
So, only two subdivisions of definition are provided. In De Oratore, however, Cicero 
drops	 the	 “name”	dimension	 altogether	 and	 transfers	 focus	 to	 the	 differences	 of	
“description”.	Crassus	says
[D]isputes as to definition arise either on the question of what is the conviction generally 
prevalent, for instance supposing the point under discussion to be whether right is the interest 
of the majority; or on the question of the essential property of something, for instance is 
elegant speaking the peculiar property of the orator or is it also in the power of somebody 
beside; or when a thing is divided into parts, for instance if it is asked how many classes there 
are	of	 things	desirable,	for	example	are	 there	 three,	goods	of	 the	body,	goods	of	 the	mind,	
external	goods;	or	on	the	problem	of	defining	the	special	form	and	natural	mark	of	a	particular	
thing, for instance supposing we are investigating the specific character of the miser, or the 
rebel, or the braggart. (1942, p. 91) 
These	four	subdivisions	can	be	summarized	simply	as	“conviction”,	“essence”,	“parts”	
and	the	last	as	“mark”,	each	bringing	increased	specification	in	place	of	his	former	term,	
the	rather	vague	“description”.	In	Topica	(1949,	p.	447),	the	subdivisions	of	“definition”	
are almost the same.7
The	subdividing	of	“nature”	 in	De Inventione is a modification of Hermagoras’s 
subdivisions,	“deliberative,	epideictic,	equitable,	and	legal”.	Cicero	picks	up	the	last	two	
of	“equitable”	and	“legal”,	and	abandons	the	other	two	as	illogical	(1949,	pp.	25-31).	But	
his	views	change.	Cicero	eliminates	the	domain	characteristics	of	“equitable”	and	“legal”	
in favour of a methodological approach. Nature can be argued simply or comparatively. In 
Topica, he frames the subdivision this way: 
When the question is about the nature of anything, it is put either simply or by comparison; 
simply as in the question: Should one seek glory?—by comparison, as: Is glory to be preferred 
to riches? (1949, p. 447)
Cicero	further	specifies	“three	kinds	of	subjects”	when	putting	the	question	simply	
(or, as we prefer, directly, since he really means by direct, not comparative, metrics): 
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sought or avoided, right or wrong, honorable or base; and two kinds for putting questions 
comparatively: on the basis of sameness / difference, or on the basis of superiority / 
inferiority (1949, p. 447). In De Oratore	he	expresses	the	same	opinion	(1942,	pp.	91-93).	
With	the	stasis	of	“action”,	the	divergence	between	his	two	stages	of	works	is	perhaps	
the greatest. In De Inventione, Cicero remarks that this stasis arises when
the question arises as to who ought to bring the action or against whom, or in what manner 
or before what court or under what law or at what time, and in general when there is some 
argument about changing or invalidating the form of procedure. (1949, p. 33) 
That	 is,	 he	 gives	 us	 “person”,	 “manner”,	 “court”,	 “law”,	 and	 “time”	 as	 the	
subdivisions of action. In De Oratore, it is quite different. Crassus says here that 
[t]hose referring to conduct either deal with the discussion of duty—the department that asks 
what action is right and proper, a topic comprising the whole subject of the virtues and vices—
or are employed either in producing or in allaying or removing some emotion. (1942, p. 93)8
In Topica	 the	author	expresses	 the	similar	subdivisions	(1949,	p.	449)	 to	 those	of	
Crassus,	which	we	may	tersely	extract	as	“duty”	and	“emotion	management”.
Table 1 summarizes our discussion and puts the early and late Ciceronian stasis 
systems side by side for comparison. We engage these systems, with a recognition of 
Cicero’s greater maturity and rhetorical sophistication in the later system, as a solid base 
for our modification. 
Table 1. Cicero’s systems of staseis and subdivisions
Staseis
Subdivisions
De Inventione De Oratore, Topica
fact past, present, future existence,	origin,	cause,	change
definition name, description conviction, essence, parts, mark
nature equitable, legal
direct 
judgment
sought / avoided
right / wrong
honorable / base
comparative judgment
same / different 
superior / inferior
action person, manner, court, law, time duty, emotion managing
3. A Modified System of Staseis’ Subdivisions
Cicero’s evolved system of stasis subdivisions shows his sustained efforts made for the 
applicability of stasis theory to all the three kinds of speeches—forensic, deliberative, 
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epideictic—while the use to which Crowely and Hawhee put that system shows its 
continued relevance. However, the system is not without its problems. Some subdivisions, 
in particular those for action, remain hard to understand and deploy. We propose now 
to revise the less manageable of the substaseis and to justify further the ones which 
we believe should be maintained as they are. Crowley and Hawhee’s adapted (later) 
Ciceronian	system	of	substaseis	is	especially	valuable	to	us	in	this	exercise,	and	we	will	
refer to it often.
For	the	stasis	of	“fact”,	Cicero’s	later	subclassifications	were	widely	accepted	in	his	
time. They are obviously richer than those of his earlier model, so (with Crowley and 
Hawhee) we adopt them in whole. They provide straight but rich avenues of invention. 
Take	(as	adapted	from	examples	in	Topica)	the	issue	of	“academic	cheating”.	Concerning	
“existence”,	a	rhetor	may	position	herself	on	either	side	of	the	question,	“Is	there	really	
any	such	 thing	as	academic	cheating?”	The	substasis	“origin”	might	be	realized	with	
respect to the question “Can academic cheating be traced back to the human nature of 
greed?”	For	“cause”,	“What	conditions	have	produced	academic	cheating?”	And	for	
“change”,	“Can	academic	cheating	be	eliminated?”	This	last	question	points	to	something	
not often noticed in stasis questions, the fact that there might be multiple directions which 
could follow from such a question, not just pro or con, but degrees of endorsement or 
rejection. For instance, Can it be ameliorated? Will it get worse? Can we virtually stamp it 
out, but there will always be a residue of dishonesty? Will it worsen until it hits a certain 
threshold? And so on. Also, a clear distinction between origin and cause is implicated by 
these	examples.	“Cause”	means	for	some	factor	(whether	agentively	or	non-agentively)	“to	
effect,	bring	about,	produce,	induce,	make”	some	occurrence	or	product,	while	“origin”	is	
“that	from	which	anything	originates,	or	is	derived;	source	of	being	or	existence;	starting	
point”.9
With	“definition”,	Cicero	 replaced	“name”	and	“description”	with	 the	broader	
and	more	concrete	set	of	substaseis,	“conviction”,	“essence”,	“parts”,	and	“mark”.	We	
(presumably with Cicero) think these four substaseis are complementary, easier for all to 
understand and apply, and functionally more effective. Let us apply it to the very term, 
“stasis”,	for	example.	The	“conviction”	for	stasis	(a	cited	definition	in	Jasinsky’s	Sourcebook) 
can	be	“a	taxonomy,	a	system	of	classifying	the	kinds	of	questions	that	can	be	at	issue	in	
a	controversy”	(Fahnestock	&	Secor,	1983,	p.	137);10	 the	“essence”	of	stasis	is	 that	 the	
issues should be the real ones agreed upon by the participants (actual or imagined); the 
“parts”	of	stasis	are	individual	embodiments,	in	this	case	(somewhat	recursively),	“fact”,	
“definition”,	“nature”	and	“action”;	and	 the	“mark”	for	stasis	 is	a	question,	direct	or	
implied. 
Crowley	and	Hawhee	shift	 the	 second	substasis	of	definition,	“essence”,	 into	a	
question of genus, suggesting that it asks “To what larger class of things or events does 
it	belong?”	(1999,	p.	50).	For	“stasis”,	on	 this	approach	we	might	call	 it	“a	strategy	
of	 invention”.	However,	 this	question	 is	very	often	answered	 in	“conviction”	phase,	
as	Fahnestock	and	Secor	do	when	they	define	“stasis”	as	belonging	to	 the	category	of	
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taxonomies;	indeed,	as	Crowley	and	Hawhee	do	when	they	define	“stasis”	as	a	“means	
of	invention”	(1999,	p.	44).	Further,	 the	genus/differentia	method,	as	a	way	of	defining,	
may	not	suit	any	number	of	cases,	while	the	explanation	of	essential	property	is	widely	
applicable.	Crowley	and	Hawhee	also	give	up	the	 last	substasis	of	definition,	“mark”,	
perhaps because of the difficulty in identification it can present. However, it is rarely 
difficult with pointing out a characteristic and relevant mark of physical objects; that’s 
why	synecdoche	is	such	a	common	strategy	for	labeling	(“all	hands	on	deck”,	“hundred	
heads	of	cattle”,	“new	set	of	wheels”).	Even	for	abstract	concepts,	 it	 is	often	tractable.	
With	“stasis”,	for	instance,	a	typical	and	relevant	mark	is	the	question.	In	short,	all	four	of	
Cicero’s	later	substaseis	of	“definition”	should	be	retained.	
With	regards	to	“nature”,	we	are	with	Crowley	and	Hawhee	in	fully	adopting	“direct	
judgment”	and	“comparative	judgment”.	Cicero’s	early	subdivisions	of	“equitable”	and	
“legal”	apply	mainly	to	law	cases,	and	concern	only	one	dimension	of	direct	judgment,	
while	his	 two	 later	classifications	of	“direct	 judgment”	 (questions	put	simply	on	 the	
nature)	and	“comparative	judgment”	(sameness	or	difference,	superiority	or	inferiority)	
cover two dimensions and suit all kinds of cases. We also accept the two substaseis and 
would	chiefly	follow	Cicero’s	related	explanations	in	applying	them.
For	 the	 fourth	 stasis	of	 “action”,	Cicero’s	 later	 divisions	of	duty and emotion 
managing go beyond his earlier substaseis, which are confined to legal speeches. But 
the two terms are rather broad and unfortunately vague; as such, they are not convenient 
for modern application. Crowley and Hawhee bravely try to remediate Cicero here, 
designing	their	own	set	of	subdivisions,	eight	in	all,	in	a	2x4	matrix.	There	are	four	main	
questions for deliberative issues, four for forensic.11 They warrant their main division 
by noting that “a rhetor who wishes to put forward a question or issue of policy must 
first deliberate [i.e., it is first a deliberative matter] about the need for the policy and 
then	argue	for	 its	 implementation	[where	it	becomes	a	forensic	matter]”	(1999,	p.	51).	
We	agree	strongly	with	Crowley	and	Hawhee	that	Cicero’s	substaseis	of	“action”	need	
remediation, but their scheme misses the mark. To our eyes at least, there is overlap 
between their two groups of questions (for instance with their deliberative questions “How 
will	 the	proposed	changes	make	 things	better?	Worse?”	and	 their	 forensic	questions	
“What	are	 the	merits	of	competing	proposals?	What	are	 their	defects?”	(1999,	p.	52).	
But with due respect, and laying aside whatever the merits might be in their project, 
there	are	 two	further	defects	 in	 their	proposal	 that	sink	it.	First,	 it	 is	 just	 too	complex.	
It	 frankly	seems	very	difficult	 to	follow	such	an	elaborate	 list,	possibly	excepting	 the	
designers themselves. But, secondly, there is already an incredibly robust and valuable 
set	of	inventive	categories/questions	for	the	stasis	of	“action”,	five	of	them.	The	set	was	
unavailable to Cicero, perhaps invisible to Crowley and Hawhee (file this under “Hiding 
in	Plain	Sight”)	but	widely	available	 in	 textbooks	across	 the	 land:	 the	 five	points	of	
Kenneth Burke’s pentad introduced in A Grammar of Motives,	“act”,	“scene”,	“agent”,	
“agency”	and	“purpose”	(1969,	p.	xv).	
Since the pentad “involves what Burke feels is a fivefold viewpoint of anything 
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whatever	that	a	man	can	discuss”	(Fogarty,	1959,	p.	62),	one	might	ask	why	we	assign	
its	terms	to	the	“action”	stasis,	rather	than	any	of	the	other	three,	or	to	all	of	them	cross-
sectionally. A fuller answer would take us too far afield, but the short answer is that 
action	 is	both	 the	nexus	of	argumentation	and	 the	nexus	of	Burke’s	 rhetoric.	On	 the	
first front, all arguments point inevitably to action. Forensic arguments, for instance, 
which orient to guilt or innocence concerning past events come down to what must be 
done with the accused, what action results from the verdict: release or conviction. And 
epideictic rhetoric orients to belief and values at the present moment. Values fuel belief 
and belief is a predisposition to action; that is, in Thomas Hill Green’s phrasing, belief 
is “incipient action; or, more properly, it is a moral action which has not yet made its 
outward	sign”	(1886,	pp.	96-97).12 On the second front, as Burke tells us in The Rhetoric 
of Religion, the whole dramatistic vocabulary, dramatism itself, is a “vocabulary of 
action”	(1970,	p.	23).	
The fivefold viewpoint, in perfect consonance with stasis theory, can be seen as “five 
questions	to	ask	about	any	topic	or	problem”	(Fogarty,	1959,	p.	62),	which	leads	us	to	
replace	Cicero’s	“action”	substaseis,	 rather	 than	with	Crowley	and	Hawhee’s	sensitive	
but overly elaborate scheme, with the more applicable, systematic, and critically robust 
“act”,	“scene”,	“agent”,	“agency”,	and	“purpose”.	Our	main	move	is	simply	to	shift	 the	
past tense13	of	critical	examination	into	present	tense,	or,	 if	the	future,	into	the	hortative	
mode (not what action will occur, for instance, but what action should occur). Under this 
slight	adjustment,	“act”	is	almost	wholly	equivalent	to	Cicero’s	“duty”	(what	act	is	being	
performed with respect to the appropriate act; or, simply, what act should be performed). 
“Scene”	is	where	and/or	when	the	act	occurs	or	should	occur.	“Agent”	is	what	person	or	
people, or kind of person, kind of people carry out, or should carry out the act, including, 
as	it	does	for	Burke,	“co-agents”,	“counter-agents”,	“personal	properties”	(“ideas”,	“the	
will”,	etc.).	“Agency”	encompasses	the	“means	or	instruments”,	which	could	be	understood	
flexibly,	including	measures,	proposals,	programs,	etc.,	for	carrying	out	the	act.	“Purpose”,	
is	the	“why”	of	an	act,	the	objective	or	anticipated	result.14 
Our	Burkean	set	of	 substaseis	 for	“action”	 is	more	definite	and	applicable	 than	
Crowley	and	Hawhee’s	complex	set	and	certainly	 than	Cicero’s	 impoverished	set,	 in	
legal	as	well	as	in	non-legal	cases.	Their	interpretation	is	flexible:	with	a	law	case,	one	
might question if the very trial (act) itself is justified; if this is the right court and ocassion 
(scene) to conduct the case; if the judge or jury (agent) is qualified to try the case; if the 
procedure	(agency)	is	appropriate	to	the	trial;	or	what	the	“purpose”	is	of	conducting	the	
trial at all. In non-legal arguments, one might argue for or against a certain task (act); 
when and where to perform the task (scene); who should perform it (agent); what means 
should be used to perform it (agency) or what objective to be fulfilled (purpose). Table 
2 summarizes what we have maintained and what we have remediated with respect to 
Cicero’s subdivisions.
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Table 2. A modified system of substaseis
Staseis Subdivisions
fact existence,	origin,	cause,	change
definition conviction, essence, parts, mark 
nature direct judgment, comparative judgment
action act, scene, agent, agency, purpose
Our neo-Ciceronian system of substaseis helps quickly to locate a significant specific 
issue	existing	between	different	parties	 in	a	 specific	 situation	and	 to	determine	 the	
other substaseis for the support. Without subdivisions, the search for conflicting issues 
is	confined	to	the	general	staseis	of	“fact”,	“definition”,	“nature”	and	“action”,	a	good	
starting point, to be sure, but handcuffing in its generality. 
4. Stasis Salience Strategies
The stasis system offers us a framework for the searching of appropriate questions, but 
often it is unnecessary to address all the staseis and substaseis; nor, we know, need there 
be a one-to-one correspondence between a given issue and the stasis with which to argue 
it. Quintilian cites the two famous defences of Milo on this front: 
[T]here is at times some doubt as to which [stasis] should be adopted, when many different 
lines of defence are brought to meet a single charge; ... I may say that the best [stasis] to 
choose	is	that	which	will	permit	the	orator	to	develop	a	maximum	of	force.	It	is	for	this	reason	
that we find Cicero and Brutus taking up different lines in defence of Milo. Cicero says 
that Clodius was justifiably killed because he sought to waylay Milo, but that Milo had not 
designed	to	kill	him;	while	Brutus,	who	wrote	his	speech	merely	as	a	rhetorical	exercise,	also	
exults	that	Milo	has	killed	a	bad	citizen.	(III.vi.92-94;	1920,	Vol.	1,	p.	457)15
Here,	we	see	that	Cicero	defends	Milo’s	killing	of	Clodius	through	“nature”	stasis,	
as	signaled	by	“justifiably”,	while	Brutus	uses	“fact”	stasis.	“In	complicated	causes,”	
Quintilian	adds,	“two	or	 three	[staseis]	may	be	found,	or	different	[staseis]”	(III.vi.94;	
1920, Vol. 1, p. 457).
Crowley	and	Hawhee	explore	 this	point	brilliantly	with	 their	pedagogical	 stasis	
analysis of two contemporary issues, abortion and hate speech. Plotting out the 
argumentative terrain of each, they trace out potential arguments where the staseis and 
substaseis	 lead.	Of	 the	former	 issue,	“definition”,	 they	note,	“is	a	crucial	stasis	 in	 the	
debate	over	abortion”	(1999,	p.	63),	while	“quality/nature”,	they	claim,	“is	a	challenging	
question	with	regard	to	the	issue	of	hate	speech”	(1999,	p.	70).
There is also a long tradition of associating staseis with categories of argument. 
Aristotle in Rhetoric	(III,	xvii)	says	that	his	three	super-genres	of	oratory	should	revolve	
around different questions; for instance, “In ceremonial speeches you will develop 
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your	case	mainly	by	arguing	that	what	has	been	done	is,	e.g.,	noble	and	useful”	(1954,	
p.	211).	The	orator,	 that	 is,	 following	this	precept,	will	 focus	on	the	stasis	of	“nature”	
in ceremonial addresses. Contemporary scholars of stasis theory, too, often continue 
this tradition of matching categories of argumentation with specific staseis. Bensel-
Meyers, for instance, matches four classes of academic discourse with their respective 
characteristic	staseis:	natural	science	argumentation	orients	 to	 the	“definition”	stasis,	
political	science	 to	“action”,	 literary	and	philosophical	argumentation	 to	“nature”,	 the	
stasis of values, and the argumentation of the disciplines in her history/economics/
psychology	matrix	 to	“fact”	(1992,	p.	17).16 This tradition reflects the ways in which 
issues and perspectives habituate to discourses, and deeper drilling into these discourses 
would no doubt have to illustrate the workings of the substaseis (which Bensel-
Meyers does not provide). Evolutionary biology, for instance, would orient toward the 
conviction	substasis	of	“definition”—what	the	morphology	evolved	to	do; in chemistry, 
the periodic table is a constellation of essences; the Linnaean system is founded on 
definitive marks.
However one aligns stases and arguments, it is clear that stases often work in 
concert—firstly, in the stasis/substasis relationship, which Quintilian tells us is 
synecdochic (“in every special question the general question is implicit, since the genus 
is	logically	prior	to	the	species”—III.v.10;	1920,	Vol.	1,	p.	401);	secondly,	in	the	cross-
sectional deployment of substaseis from different general staseis (“it need disturb no 
one,”	Quintilian	reassures	us	on	this	front,	for	instance,	“that	one	law	may	originate	in	
two	[stases]”	III.vi.101;	1920,	Vol.	1,	p.	461).	Argumentation	is	not	a	matter,	despite	how	
pedagogically convenient it might be to pretend the reverse, of a simple one-stasis-one-
argument mapping. Crowley and Hawhee’s procedure is especially valuable here, as they 
analyze all four staseis in both of their causes, abortion and hate speech, with special 
attention to the reciprocal implications of various staseis and substaseis. 
There are, then, two central features of stasis theory that any framework needs to 
recognize: the alignment of staseis and categories of discourse, and the widespread 
occurrence of multi-staseis functionality. Together, these features suggest a kind of 
figure/ground relationship (using the terms of Gestalt psychology), in which stasis theory 
as a whole is the argumentation ground and specific staseis stand out saliently against 
that	ground.	We	would	extend	this	strategy,	for	both	rhetorical	criticism	and	rhetorical	
construction:	stasis	 theory	has	 two	layers:	 the	four-stasis	complex,	against	which	one	
stasis takes prominence, and the stasis itself, against which the substasis is defined. The 
Gestalt terminology, however, while well known and helpful in brief illustrations, will 
not do for theoretical purposes—in part because it primarily denotes a visual relationship, 
in part because the word figure—central to rhetoric generally and, under the influence 
of Jeanne Fahnestock’s Rhetorical Figures in Science (1999), to argumentation theory, 
in a radically different and more common meaning—will lead to endless confounding. 
And while the relationship is theoretically relative, with the figure in principle becoming 
the ground to a further figure or figures, as the granularity (what Burke called the 
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circumference)	changes,	it	tends	to	suggest	a	misleading	fixedness.	Cognitive	Linguistics,	
however, has adapted the figure/ground concept to language with a new and revealing 
terminological shift and a layered granularity. 
Ronald Langacker, who is most responsible for this adaptation and the terminology, 
identifies the base (the scope of a predication) and the profile (its designatum) of 
expressions.	For	example—the	 sort	of	 simple	geometrical	 example	 that	Langacker	
favours, for its precision and its cognitive implications—an arc is a two-dimensional 
curved line. Yet, it cannot be only a two-dimensional curved line. An arc presupposes 
a base domain, the circle, as its semantic fundament. “[O]nly when a set of points is 
identified	with	a	portion	of	a	circle,”	Langacker	notes,	“is	it	recognized	as	constituting	
an	arc	(and	not	just	a	curved	line	segment)”	(1987,	p.	184).	An	arc	is	a	profiled	section	
of a (presupposed) circle. Meanwhile, a circle is a profiled section of a (presupposed) 
otherwise	empty	space.	“The	semantic	value	of	an	expression,”	Langacker	says,	
resides in neither the base nor the profile alone, but only in their combination; it derives from 
the designation of a specific entity identified and characterized by its position within a larger 
configuration. (ibid., p. 183) 
One could not ask for a better description of how a given stasis functions against the 
backdrop issue-field of possibilities stasis theory defines. In our terms, the four-stasis 
system is the base, and the selected is the profile; their combination helps to better judge 
or generate the persuasiveness of an argument. We would say, paraphrasing Langacker, 
that the rhetorical value of an argument resides neither in stasis base nor in the selected 
particular stas(e)is alone, but in their combination. Langacker’s second layer of salience is 
established within the profile: 
In virtually every relational predication, an asymmetry can be observed between the profiled 
participants. One of them, called the trajector, has special status and is characterized as the 
figure within a relational profile.... Other salient entities in a relational predication are referred 
to as landmarks, so called because they are naturally viewed as providing points of reference 
for locating the trajector. (ibid., p. 217)
Thus,	in	a	predication	like	“Marco	left	the	game”,	Marco is the trajector, with respect 
to leave, while the game is the landmark. For stasis theory, among the profiled/selected 
staseis, only one stasis, in particular, its one substasis relating to a specific claim is a 
trajector, all the other selected serve as landmark. 
To sum up, drawing on Langacker’s two-layer salience theory, profile-base, trajector-
landmark, we justify two stasis deployment strategies: stasis selection (selecting the 
needed for the topic) and prominence treatment (choosing one as the governing).
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5. How Stasis Salience Reveals the Enthymemic Thesis
The enthymemic thesis refers to an argument’s thesis statement which takes the form of 
“the conclusion of a syllogism in the first clause and the least acceptable premise in the 
‘because’	clause”	(Bensel-Meyers,	1992,	p.	124).	The	second	clause	is	a	minor	premise;	
the missing major premise is often assumed to be accepted by the readers.17 We agree 
that the thesis of every article should be looked upon as an enthymeme, in any of several 
forms.18	Often—perhaps	most	often—an	argument	will	 express	 several	 standpoints	
and its author fails to offer a central one at a usual position. In such cases, how do we 
recognize its thesis? Our layered stasis-salience strategy, we contend, will help quickly 
to locate the enthymemic thesis, for the prominent stasis among those at work reveals the 
author’s main point. We know argumentation theorists are not always in the market for 
new vocabularies. But the notions of (1) a fundamental ground (base) of all staseis against 
which the selected are figured (profiled), and (2) the sense of the supporting (landmark) to 
contrast with the leading (its specifically instantiated trajector), can theoretically, critically, 
and methodologically enrich stasis theory. If we think in these terms, irrespective of our 
theoretical	 lexicon,	our	stasis	analyses	and	our	argument	 invention	will	both	be	more	
potent. 
Abraham Lincoln’s well-known and remarkable ten-sentence Gettysburg Address is 
an	excellent	case	in	point.	Because	of	its	brevity,	we	reproduce	it	(in	the	standard	Bliss	
version) in its entirety.
Address at Gettysburg
[1] Four score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent a new nation, 
conceived in liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.
[2] Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation, or any nation so 
conceived and so dedicated, can long endure. [3] We are met on a great battlefield of that war. 
[4] We have come to dedicate a portion of that field as a final resting place for those who here 
gave their lives that that nation might live. [5] It is altogether fitting and proper that we should 
do this.
[6] But, in a larger sense, we cannot dedicate—we cannot consecrate—we cannot hallow—
this ground. [7] The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here, have consecrated it far 
above our poor power to add or detract. [8] The world will little note nor long remember what 
we say here, but it can never forget what they did here. [9] It is for us, the living, rather, to 
be dedicated here to the unfinished work which they who fought here have thus far so nobly 
advanced. [10] It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us—
that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the 
last full measure of devotion; that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died 
in vain; that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom; and that government of 
the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.
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Using a base of the 4-stasis system, we see that the Gettysburg Address profiles three 
staseis:	“fact”,	“nature”,	and	“action”,	with	“definition”	left	out.	The	first	four	sentences	
are	about	 the	“fact”	of	dedication,	among	which	S4	concerns	 the	“existence”	of	 the	
dedication,	S2	and	S3	 the	“cause”	(the	civil	war	 leading	 to	 the	 loss	of	 lives	and	 this	
dedication),	and	S1	the	noble	“origin”.	S5-S8	orient	 to	 the	“nature”	of	 this	dedication	
via	 the	“direct	 judgment”	(altogether	fitting	and	proper)	and	“comparative	 judgment”	
(S7	and	S8).	The	last	two	long	sentences	evince	the	stasis	of	“action”.	Using	our	revised	
pentad	substaseis,	we	see	that	the	“act”	has	the	part	of	“the	unfinished	work	…	the	great	
task	remaining	before	us”;	that	is,	the	carrying	out	of	the	on-going	civil	war.	“Scene”	is	
the	repeated	“here”	and	the	implied	“now”	to	stress	the	urgency	of	the	act.	As	to	“agent”,	
the	reiterated	“us/the	 living”	and	“we”	demonstrate	who	will	carry	on	 the	act,	but	we	
may	understand	these	flexible	terms	either	narrowly	as	the	government	and	its	army,	or	
broadly,	as	all	people	supporting	this	war.	“Agency”	can	be	identified	as	“be	dedicated	
to”,	“take	increased	devotion”,	and	“highly	resolve”.	“Purpose”	is	the	most	elaborate	of	
all these substaseis, represented by three specific aims: “that these dead shall not have 
died in vain; that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom; and that 
government	of	the	people,	by	the	people,	for	the	people,	shall	not	perish	from	the	earth.”	
“Action”,	 then,	 is	 the	prominent	 stasis	 (trajector)	 in	contrast	with	 the	other	 two	
selected staseis (landmark); it plays the governing role in the Gettysburg Address. For 
comparatively,	it	occupies	more	space	than	either	“fact”	or	“nature”;	all	its	five	substaseis	
are covered, forcefully or substantially; and the flurry of three aims occupies the location 
of the greatest salience, the very end of the address. The enthymemic thesis of the speech, 
therefore,	should	be	closely	related	to	the	“action”	stasis,	which	can	be	extracted	from	
S9-S10:	“We	should	carry	on	this	civil	war	to	the	end	(the	unfinished	work/task);”	all	the	
other sentences mainly contribute to the minor premise, which can be condensed into “this 
civil	war	is	for	liberty	and	equality”,	with	the	assumed	major	premise	of	“a	war	for	liberty	
and	equality	should	be	carried	on	to	 the	end”.	Combining	the	enthymemic	thesis	with	
stasis salience, especially the prominent stasis, assists us effectively to identify the central 
point of the discourse. 
6. How the Enthymemic Thesis Dominates Stasis Salience
At the productive end of argumentation, once we secure the thesis of the argument, the 
stasis outline can be worked out; to be specific, the enthymemic thesis statement will 
determine the stasis salience: the selection of the staseis and the prominent treatment. For 
example,	the	following	four	enthymemic	theses19 will evince different stasis salience:
(1) One-upsmanship is the root cause of fierce competition.
The	thesis	itself	profiles	the	“fact”	stasis	upon	the	base	of	all	the	four	staseis,	as	it	offers	the	
“cause”	 to	 the	“existence”	of	fierce	competition,	so	 this	stasis	must	be	deployed	fully	and	
prominently,	better	with	all	 the	substaseis	 (“existence”,	“origin”,	“cause”	and	“change”)	
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covered	substantially;	especially	“cause”,	 the	 trajector	core,	which	requires	 the	distinction	
between root cause and other causes, and proportionate illustrations. For the other three staseis, 
“definition”	can	be	deployed	to	support	the	thesis,	providing	a	clear	interpretation	of	the	key	
concept	“one-upsmanship”;	but	the	staseis	of	“nature”	and	“action”	are	marginal	to	this	thesis,	
whether one covers them or not mainly depends on the scale of the argument. That is to say, 
the	stasis	other	than	“fact”	may	in	this	case	be	chosen	as	profile,	but	never	as	trajector.
(2) Bats are mammals not birds.
This	enthymemic	thesis	centralizes	the	stasis	of	“definition”	(note	that	 this	 is	what	Bensel-
Meyers	predicts,	with	a	 ‘scientific’	 thesis),	putting	all	of	“conviction”,	“essence”,	“parts”	
and	“marks”	into	play,	 in	order	 to	fully	articulate	 the	definition.	Reasonably,	“essence”/the	
essential property of bats (the appropriate minor premise) should be treated as trajector: they 
do	not	reproduce	via	eggs	but	embryos.	Besides	the	compulsory	“definition”	profile,	one	may	
include	the	“fact”	stasis	concerning	the	“existence”	of	the	confusion	and	the	major	“cause”	of	
the	mistaking;	and	one	might	even	touch	upon	“nature”	by	comparing	such	a	thesis	with	the	
similar	claim	that	“whales	are	mammals	not	fish.”	The	stasis	of	“action”,	however,	has	little	if	
any role in supporting this thesis.
(3) Supervised group work plays a constructive role in writing instruction. 
The	enthymemic	 thesis	here	profiles	 the	“nature”	of	 the	 supervised	group	work,	 so	 the	
argument	 should	 revolve	 around	 this	 stasis	 by	 illustrating	 its	 “direct	 judgment”,	 here	
“constructive”,	with	typical	examples	and	their	analyses;	and	“comparative	judgment”	of	the	
contributing advantages engendered from valid cooperation throughout the process, in contrast 
with the non-supervised group work or with the merely individual work. Of the other three 
staseis,	 the	“definition”	of	“supervised	group	work”	can	be	supportive;	a	brief	 introduction	
of	“fact”	as	to	the	controversial	function	of	group	work	in	writing	might	serve	as	a	desirable	
beginning;	the	“action”	stasis	is	optional,	and	can	be	ignored	with	the	constraints	of	time	or	
space allocated to delivering the argument. In brief, as profile, there can be one or more staseis 
chosen,	but	for	this	 thesis,	only	“nature”	is	suitable	to	be	a	trajector,	 its	substasis	of	“direct	
judgment”,	in	particular.
(4) A severe policy should be implemented against plagiarism in term paper.
This	enthymemic	thesis	is	patently	“action”-centered.	Logically,	the	argument	should	develop	
around	“act”,	“scene”,	“agent”,	“agency”,	and	“purpose”.	Of	all	 the	substaseis,	“agency”	
takes prominence (implementing a severe policy in place of a current mild one) and drives 
the argument most substantially. For the other three first-layer staseis, they are all supportive 
but	need	not	be	elaborated.	A	“definition”	of	“plagiarism”	is	likely	necessary,	as	controversy	
often	arises	 in	regards	 to	criteria;	 the	serious	“nature”	of	plagiarism	at	 the	present	 time	is	
worth	mentioning	(if	time/space	provides);	statistics	about	the	“fact”	of	plagiarism	on	campus,	
or	a	compelling	example	of	the	“fact”	of	plagiarism,	might	bring	up	the	rear	stasis	invention	
strategies.	So,	in	this	case,	while	more	than	one	stasis	may	be	chosen	as	profile,	only	“action”	
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should	be	treated	as	trajector,	with	its	substasis	of	“agency”	as	the	most	prominent.
We don’t mean to suggest that argument construction must have a paint-by-numbers 
stasis strategy, of course. There are a variety of methods to build an essay outline: 
brainstorming,	branching,	six-perspective	cubing	(description,	comparison,	association,	
analysis, application, argument),20 syllogistic term developing,21 and so on. Each method, 
favored by different rhetors, undoubtedly possesses unique advantages in tackling 
certain topics or genres. However, we contend that a stasis salience outline keyed to the 
enthymemic thesis on its own is powerfully sufficient, and in combination with other 
methods can enhance them substantially. 
7. Conclusion
Our investigation involves three specific inquiries in order to clarify stasis theory, 
rejuvenate it in a neoCiceronian mode, and link it productively to the enthymeme (by way 
of the enthymemic thesis). We carried out a focused survey of the interplay traces of the 
two terms in modern rhetoric and discover that although Gage and Bensel-Meyers have 
manifestly connected them, the linking they make is still confined due to their one layer 
stasis system and restricted forms of enthymeme. But the further classifications of the 
four staseis and the possible forms of enthymeme remain disputable among rhetoricians 
and	other	argumentation	theorists;	 thus,	 it	 is	here	that	we	exert	most	of	our	efforts.	By	
comprehensively tracing Cicero’s stasis subcategorizations, we encourage maintaining 
his	reasonable	substaseis,	across	“fact”,	“definition”,	and	“nature”,	while	replacing	his	
ineffective	“action”	substaseis,	in	the	light	of	Burke’s	dramatic	pentad.	With	Langacker’s	
two-layer salience theory, we illustrate the stasis deployment strategies of stasis selection 
(profile against base) and prominence treatment (trajector against landmark). Combining 
this stasis salience system with the enthymemic thesis, we show that these two can 
be powerfully linked: in criticism (discourse analysis), one can identify the thesis by 
examining	the	author’s	stasis	salience	strategies	(conducted	consciously	or	unconsciously),	
especially the content of the prominent stasis; and in production, the enthymemic thesis 
should dominate the choice of the staseis and the prominence treatment of the trajector 
stasis, so that the whole essay will remain focused and coherent. To carry home our 
proposals, we put this model to work in both an analysis of Lincoln’s masterful address 
and the projected invention of argument outlines in four prototypical theses.
Notes
1 This research has been supported by Chinese National Social Science Fund Project: “On 
Argumentative	Textual	Functions	of	Major	Tropes	and	Schemes”	(15BYY178).
2 As Bensel-Meyers states most clearly, “an enthymeme or rhetorical syllogism … represents the 
conclusion of a syllogism in the first clause and the least acceptable premise in the ‘because’ 
clause”	(1992,	p.	124).	
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3	 Action	is	perhaps	the	most	variably	named	of	the	canonical	staseis;	“jurisdiction”,	“procedure”,	
and	“policy”	are	almost	equally	distributed	with	“action”,	largely	on	the	basis	of	which action 
is at issue. If it is argumentative action—whether, say, some given evidence is admissible, 
or	whether	a	given	forum	is	appropriate	 to	hear	or	adjudicate	 the	argument—“jurisdiction”	
and	“procedure”	are	preferred.	When	the	action,	 rather,	 is	 the	outcome	of	 the	argument—
whether	we	should	build	this	bridge	or	pass	that	legislation—“policy”	is	preferred.	“Action”	
more easily encompasses both foci. It is also, as Walsh (2013, p. 230, Note 9) points out, the 
preferred term in composition studies. 
4 Kennedy is rendering Hermagoras’s version of stasis theory, in which the fourth stasis maps 
more directly into jurisdiction (1994, p. 99) and is therefore orthogonal to the other three. 
One can argue jurisdiction independent of fact, definition, and quality. Curiously, though, he 
(following Hermagoras) lists the fourth stasis as the fourth stasis,	last.	For	a	more	expansive	
notion of this stasis, in which the action might be of procedure or of outcome, the fourth 
position is more natural. 
5	 This	order	appears	in	Ixxxi,	IIxxv,	IIIxix,	but	in	IIIxxx	the	more	frequent	order	is	adopted.
6 De Oratore appears to be in synch. Crassus says that “Reverting to inference, they divide 
it	 into	four	classes,	 the	question	being	either	what	actually	exists,…or	what	 is	 the	origin	of	
something,…or	the	cause	and	reason	of	things,…or	it	deals	with	change,…”	(1942,	p.	91)
7	 He	says	in	Chapter	XXII,	“When	the	question	concerns	what	a	 thing	is,	one	has	to	explain	
the concept [conviction], and the peculiar or proper quality of the thing [essence], analyze 
it and enumerate its parts [parts]. For these are the essentials of definition. We also include 
description,	which	the	Greeks	call	(character	or	hall	mark)	[mark].”	(1949,	p.	447)
8	 Here,	 the	 term	“conduct”	 for	 the	 last	 stasis,	 replaced	with	“action”	 in	 the	context,	 is	an	
equivalent	 to	“the	translative”	of	De Inventione, though they are almost totally different in 
their respective subclassifications.
9 The distinction is based on the online Oxford English Dictionary, from which all the quotations 
are drawn.
10 As we have seen, in De Oratore	Cicero	thought	conviction	to	be	“generally	prevalent”	(1942,	
p. 91). But Cicero was no linguist, and we recognize that definitions for some concepts may 
not be agreed upon, may even be contested. Though it makes no immediate difference to our 
argument, we feel it more operative to treat prevalence as contingent upon groups, from small 
to culture-wide, leaving out only an individual semantic conviction (of the Humpty-Dumpty, 
“glory”	sort),	which	is	rhetorically	pathological.
11 In our recent revising of the manuscript, we find that in their 2012 Pearson edition, they have 
listed almost the same questions; just the last question in the (1999 edition) forensic set has 
been left out.
12	 We	do	not	know	the	exact	provenance	of	this	term,	“incipient	action”—perhaps	John	Mason	
Good’s 1805 translation of Lucretius, the earliest usage we could find (Lucretius, III. 255, p. 
367)—but it was common in 19th century philosophical, theological and chemical discourse. 
Burke, of course, adapted it from I. A. Richards (Burke, 1969, p. 235). 
13 Burke in A Grammar of Motives	explains	his	pentad	in	the	past	tense:	“what	was	done	(act),	
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when or where it was done (scene), who did it (agent), how he did it (agency), and why 
(purpose).”	(1969,	p.	xv)
14 The phrases and brief quotations in this paragraph are all from Grammar’s “Introduction: The 
Five	Key	Terms	of	Dramatism”	(Burke,	1969,	pp.	xv-xx).
15	 In	Butler’s	otherwise	exemplary	translation	of	the	Institutes, he translates statu (and related 
forms) as basis. We interpolate the preferred term.
16	 Bensel-Meyers	has	 a	 somewhat	 idiosyncratic	 taxonomy	of	 staseis	 (“Policy”,	 “Value”,	
“Consequence”,	and	“Definition”),	which	we	have	translated	(where	relevant,	for	expository	
reasons) into the more common stasis terminology we use throughout this paper.
17	 We	do	not	wish	 to	engage	 the	extensive	 literature	on	 the	 true	nature	of	 the	enthymeme.	
Rather, we will just sketch the interpretation which applies in our current argument. We are 
with	Aristotle,	mainly	based	on	his	account	of	 the	 two	defining	 traits:	“abbreviation”	and	
“probability”.	The	former	 is	perhaps	more	controversial.	He	describes	 the	feature	 in	 these	
terms:
The enthymeme must consist of few propositions, fewer often than those which make up the normal 
syllogism. For if any of these propositions is a familiar fact, there is no need even to mention it; the 
hearer adds it himself. Thus, to show that Dorieus has been victor in a contest for which the prize is 
a crown, it is enough to say ‘For he has been victor in the Olympic games’, without adding ‘And in 
the Olympic games the prize is a crown’, a fact which everybody knows. (1954, p. 28)
Many	rhetoricians	and	logicians	consider	an	“incompleteness”	to	be	the	very	characteristic	
of	enthymeme.	Perelman,	 for	example,	defines	enthymemes	as	“abbreviated	syllogisms”	
(1979, p. 26). Others, including Bitzer (1959), Green (1995), and Yuan (2006) do not regard 
truncation	 to	be	 indispensable,	which	 is	 the	position	we	adopt	here.	As	 to	“probability”,	
Aristotle means that compared with the standard syllogism, the conclusion reached through an 
enthymeme most often displays the character of being probable, as “the propositions forming 
the basis of enthymemes, though some of them may be ‘necessary’, will most of them be only 
usually	[contingently]	true”	(1954,	p.	28).
18 Based upon the in-depth investigation of Aristotle’s related remarks and illustrations as 
well	as	Cooper’s	(1932)	“Introduction”	to	his	 translation	of	 the	Rhetoric, Yuan (2006) first 
justified 7 forms of enthymeme/rhetorical syllogism from the complete form with all the three 
propositions to the omission of one or two propositions. Most popular, perhaps, is the two-
proposition enthymeme of conclusion plus minor premise. 
19 To be concise, here we construct all the theses in the form of one proposition enthymeme 
which has been proved to be one type of the 7 rhetorical syllogisms in Yuan (2006).
20 These methods are summarized from Shouhua Qi (2000) Western Writing Theories, 
Pedagogies, and Practices. 
21 This method is from Bensel-Meyers (1992), outlining argumentation mainly around the three 
syllogistic terms and their interrelationships in the enthymeme.
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